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The landscape of water infrastructure in the Nile Basin is changing with the construction of
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Although this dam could improve electricity supply in
Ethiopia and its neighbors, there is a lack of consensus between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt on
the dam operation. We introduce a new modeling framework that simulates the Nile River
System and Egypt’s macroeconomy, with dynamic feedbacks between the river system and
the macroeconomy. Because the two systems “coevolve” throughout multi-year simulations,
we term this a “coevolutionary” modeling framework. The framework is used to demonstrate
that a coordinated operating strategy could allow the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam to
help meet water demands in Egypt during periods of water scarcity and increase hydropower
generation and storage in Ethiopia during high flows. Here we show the hydrological and
macroeconomic performance of this coordinated strategy compared to a strategy that
resembles a recent draft proposal for the operation of the dam discussed in Washington DC.
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Freshwater and electricity are essential inputs to many pro-duction activities that drive the economic development andwell-being of societies. The scarcity and variability of
freshwater resources have been shown to affect the economic
growth of nations1,2. Empirical evidence of uni- and bidirectional
relationships between energy consumption and economic devel-
opment have been documented in countries around the world3–6.
Water and energy systems are interlinked with each other and
with several sectors, including agriculture and industry7. Globally,
hydropower contributes around 16% of electricity generation and
approximately 70% of renewable electricity generation8, and
rivers are frequently used to cool power plants9,10. Energy is used
for water treatment, pumping, and desalinization. Therefore,
efficient use of limited water resources to achieve sustainable
economic development requires assessing water and economy
interventions in an integrated way.
The Nile is one of the longest rivers in the world and has a
basin that extends over 11 African countries, each with a different
contribution to and economic dependence on the river11,12. The
Nile comprises three main tributaries: the White Nile, the Blue
Nile, and the Tekeze-Atbara (see Fig. 1). The Blue Nile originates
in Ethiopia and contributes around 57% of the Nile streamflow as
measured near the Sudanese–Egyptian border13. High inter- and
intra-annual variabilities characterize the Blue Nile streamflow,
with around 80% of the flow occurring from July to October14.
Nearly all the Nile streamflow, measured near the
Sudanese–Egyptian border, is currently consumed by the two
most downstream riparian countries, i.e., Egypt and Sudan.
Egypt’s water, energy, food, and economic system is linked to the
Nile streamflow, which provides around 90% of the country’s
freshwater consumption15 and 7% of its electricity supply
through hydropower8. On average, irrigated agriculture accounts
for approximately 82% of Egypt’s annual Nile water withdrawal,
while municipal and industrial water users account for 18%16.
In 1999, the Nile Basin countries established the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI) as a forum for coordination and collaboration on
managing the river17. The NBI refers to two regions of the Nile
Basin: the Eastern Nile Basin (Fig. 1) and the Nile Equatorial
Lakes Region. The NBI worked with the member states to craft
the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement
(CFA)18. In 2010, Egypt and Sudan froze their memberships in
the NBI due to disagreements over the text of the CFA, but Sudan
returned to full membership 2 years later19.
The United States Bureau of Reclamation conducted a study
between 1958 and 1963 (published in 1964) that identified
potential dams and irrigation projects on the Blue Nile in
Ethiopia20. Dams on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia could increase
hydropower generation markedly21. However, they could increase
the complexity of managing multiyear droughts20,22. Under
the auspices of the NBI, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt launched the
Fig. 1 Major dams and existing large-scale irrigation in the Eastern Nile River Basin. The true-color image shown in the figure’s background is based on
the satellite imagery of the world managed by the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI). The existing irrigation layer is based on the Global
Map of Irrigation Areas (GMIA) developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The national boundary layer is based on
the Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM).
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Joint Multipurpose Program in 2005 to facilitate coordinated
development of investment projects in the Eastern Nile Basin.
The three countries invited the World Bank to constitute an
independent expert team to conduct a scoping study to inform
the selection of a first set of multipurpose projects that would
benefit all three countries22. The scoping study team concluded
that the best investment opportunities for a joint multipurpose
project were in the Blue Nile Basin in Ethiopia. Egyptian pol-
icymakers and technical experts contested this conclusion and
argued that there were promising options for a joint multipurpose
project in the Baro–Akobo–Sobat Basin23. This disagreement on
the scoping study’s main conclusion led to a loss of political
momentum and eventually failure to achieve the JMP goals23. In
2011, Ethiopia unilaterally started the construction of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). On 12 July 2020, con-
struction was around 75% complete, and Ethiopia began the
initial filling of the dam’s reservoir.
When completed, the GERD will be the largest hydropower
facility in Africa, with a power capacity of 5150MW and reservoir
storage of 74 billion cubic meters (bcm). The dam will double
Ethiopia’s electricity generation and potentially stimulate the
country’s economic growth through increases in the output of
electricity-dependent sectors and other sectors via forward and
backward economic linkages. However, the initial filling and
long-term operation of the GERD reservoir are expected to sig-
nificantly alter the pattern of flow of the Blue Nile downstream of
the dam, imposing a range of opportunities and risks to Sudan
and Egypt24–26. Sudan is expected to benefit from the GERD in
terms of improved irrigation water supply reliability, hydropower
generation, and riverine flood control provided there is essential
daily coordination and data sharing with Ethiopia24,27, but
adverse environmental impacts and a loss of recession agriculture
are also anticipated28.
Despite several years of negotiations (since 2011) between the
Ethiopian, Sudanese, and Egyptian governments on the GERD’s
initial filling and long-term operation, no agreement has yet been
reached. In 2012, the three countries formed an International
Panel of Experts (IPoE) to review the design and impact reports
of the dam29. The IPoE recommended conducting further tech-
nical studies on the GERD design and impacts. An international,
non-partisan Eastern Nile working group met at the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology in 2014 to discuss the impacts of the
GERD on regional development30. The group pointed out four
issues: the need for coordinated operation of the GERD and the
High Aswan Dam (HAD), technical concerns on the design of the
GERD, the need for an electricity sale agreement, and potential
negative impacts on irrigated agriculture in Egypt and recession
agriculture in Sudan. In March 2015, the heads of the Ethiopian,
Sudanese, and Egyptian governments signed a Declaration of
Principles (DoP) on the GERD31. Most of the principles in the
DoP are derived from the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses32,
including the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization
and not to cause significant harm. The DoP stated the need to
conduct the studies recommended by the IPoE and utilize the
outcomes of these studies to agree on rules and guidelines for
the initial filling and long-term operation of the GERD. In 2015,
the three countries agreed to contract a consortium of interna-
tional consultancy firms to conduct the studies recommended by
the IPoE. However, this effort failed due to disagreements among
the riparians on the terms of reference of the studies and how
baseline water allocations should be handled in the construction
of scenarios to be examined in the consortium’s analyses33.
In 2018, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt formed a National Inde-
pendent Scientific Research Group (NISRG) of researchers from
the three countries. The NISRG process did not lead to a final
agreement among the riparians, but its technical outcomes con-
stituted the basis for subsequent negotiations on the initial filling
and long-term operation of the dam34. From November 2019 to
February 2020, several rounds of negotiations occurred, including
meetings in Washington DC with the United States Government
and the World Bank as observers35; yet, no agreement was signed.
From June 2020, the African Union initiated and hosted further
negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt with the United
States Government, the World Bank, and the European Union as
observers. Still, no agreement had been reached at the time this
article was being finalized (September 2021). The main points of
contention remaining among the riparians are (1) the length of
the agreement, i.e., whether it is an interim or permanent
agreement; (2) the relationship between the GERD agreement and
future water development projects in Ethiopia, (3) the linkage
between the GERD agreement and a permanent water allocation
agreement among the riparians in the Nile Basin, and (4) the
mechanisms to resolve future conflicts should they arise34.
Previous studies have investigated the impacts of GERD
filling and long-term operation on Ethiopia, Sudan, and
Egypt24–27,36–40. However, these studies used simple representa-
tions of the linkages between the river system and the Eastern
Nile economies. In reality, economic growth affects water and
electricity demands, and the abundance or scarcity of water and
electricity have a feedback effect on economic growth41.
We have two objectives in this paper. The first is to present a
new coevolutionary hydro-economic modeling framework that
captures the dynamic interactions between a river’s hydrology and
infrastructure and the macroeconomy of one of the river’s ripar-
ians (Egypt). The second is to use this multi-sector dynamic
modeling framework to examine a coordinated operating strategy
(termed “coordinated operation”) for filling and operating the
GERD on the Nile River. With the coordinated operation, the
GERD helps, under specific conditions, meet water consumption
targets in Egypt and Sudan, and Ethiopia takes advantage of extra
water during periods of high flows to increase GERD storage and
maximize hydropower production. Coordinated operation is best
conceptualized as an operating policy of “neighbors looking out
for each other,” especially during multiyear hydrological droughts.
We compare the coordinated operation strategy to a strategy that
resembles the proposal for operating the GERD discussed as part
of the negotiations between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in late
2019 and early 2020 in Washington DC (herein, the examined
strategy, including some assumptions, is termed the “Washington
draft proposal”). Details on the assumptions and differences
between coordinated operation and the GERD operating policy in
the Washington draft proposal are provided in the next section
and the “Methods” section. To assess the dynamic interactions
between the Nile and the sectors of Egypt’s economy, we use a
calibrated river system model of the Eastern Nile Basin coupled
with a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of Egypt’s
economy. The water and economy models are developed and
connected using open-source modeling frameworks42–44, as
described in the “Methods” section. Results show that in most of
the examined hydrological scenarios, coordinated filling and
operation of the GERD increases the total electricity generation
from both the GERD and the entire Nile system, sustains Sudan’s
Nile water use, decreases Egypt’s irrigation water deficits, and
increases Egypt’s total gross domestic product (GDP) and other
macroeconomic metrics compared to the Washington draft
proposal.
Results
The Washington draft proposal versus coordinated operation.
We compare the impacts of two GERD filling and long-term
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operation approaches: (a) Washington draft proposal and
(b) coordinated operation. Table 1 summarizes the two examined
operating strategies and their key assumptions. Further details on
how the two operating strategies are implemented in the mod-
eling framework are provided in the “Methods” section. Both
operating strategies assume that Ethiopia targets withdrawal of
2.5 bcm annually upstream of the GERD and that Sudan targets
withdrawal of 17.7 bcm/year. The assumed total Ethiopian water
withdrawal target is the sum of the withdrawal targets of the
Finchaa and Beles irrigation schemes, which are on the Blue Nile,
whereas the total Sudanese water withdrawal target is the sum of
the withdrawal targets of existing irrigation and municipal water
users in Sudan on the Blue Nile, the White Nile, the Tekeze-
Atbara, and the Main Nile. Egypt attempts to withdraw 3.8 bcm
upstream of the HAD and release 51.7 bcm from the HAD (a
total of 55.5 bcm), its water allocation under the 1959 Nile Waters
Agreement45. Deficits in Egypt are measured from this 55.5 bcm
target. It is worth noting that Egypt and Sudan have different
views on how evaporation losses should be considered in their
1959 bi-lateral water allocation agreement45. Egypt believes that
reservoir evaporation from dams constructed after the 1959
agreement (i.e., Merowe, Roseires heightening, and Upper Atbara
and Setit) is part of water allocations, while Sudan argues the
opposite25. In this study, we assume the target withdrawals by
Ethiopia and Sudan and the target releases from the HAD to
illustrate the behavior of the hydrological and economic systems;
they do not reflect an endorsement of the status quo water allo-
cation in the Nile Basin.
In this study, the examined Washington draft proposal
resembles the proposal annexed in the letter of the permanent
representative of Egypt to the United Nations to the President of
the United Nations Security Council dated 19 June 202046.
Ethiopia has not accepted this draft proposal. The Washington
draft proposal suggests limiting the period during which Ethiopia
can retain Nile flows to fill the GERD Reservoir to the peak of the
annual flood season in July and August35. The Washington draft
proposal enables Ethiopia to ramp up GERD storage so that all
turbines can become operational within the first 2 years of initial
filling to guarantee that Ethiopia can quickly begin electricity
generation. The Washington draft proposal mitigates the
consequences of droughts, prolonged droughts, and prolonged
periods of dry years using three operating constraints on the
GERD46: (a) a minimum annual release depending on the inflow,
(b) a 4-year minimum average annual release, and (c) a 5-year
minimum average annual release. Given these three constraints
on GERD operation, Ethiopia would still have some operational
flexibility. Thus, we assume that once reservoir storage reaches
the long-term operation stage (49.3 bcm), Ethiopia would operate
the GERD to maximize the 90% power reliability and sustain a
minimum environmental flow of 43Mm3/day (million cubic
meters/day) subject to these three drought mitigation mechan-
isms. Further details on the drought mitigation mechanisms of
the Washington draft proposal and their implementation and
assumptions in the model are provided in the “Methods” section.
Figure 2 shows a flowchart of the examined coordinated
operation strategy. A description and a schematic of the Eastern
Nile River system model are provided in the “Methods” section
and the Supplementary information. The rationale behind the
coordinated operation strategy we examine in this study aims for
some measure of hydro-solidarity, “neighbors looking out for
each other,” where political boundaries are relaxed but with some
national goals remaining. The coordinated operation strategy is
not designed to be a prescribed solution for Nile water issues;
rather, we use it to demonstrate the direction of change in
economic performance and resilience that transboundary colla-
boration holds. We configured the coordinated operation strategy
manually through trial and error, inspired by operating policies of
previous studies24,37,47. In the coordinated operation approach,
Table 1 Main assumptions and attributes of the Washington draft proposal and coordinated operation.
Attribute Washington draft proposal Coordinated operation




Water withdrawal target from the HAD
reservoir plus water release target from
the HAD (bcm)
Egypt= 55.5 Egypt= 55.5
GERD water release rules • Complying with drought mitigation mechanisms
(see the “Methods” section for details)
• Generating 1170 GWh/month during long-term
operation when reservoir storage is at or above
49.3 bcm
• Generating 585 GWh/month during long-term
operation when reservoir storage is below
49.3 bcm
• When physically possible, monthly releases are
greater than or equal to Sudan’s monthly water
withdrawal targets on the Blue and Main Nile plus
Egypt’s monthly water release targets from HAD if
HAD storage is below 50 bcm (156m a.s.l.)
• Generating 1170 GWh/month during long-term
operation when reservoir storage is at or above
49.3 bcm
• Generating 585 GWh/month during long-term
operation when reservoir storage is below 49.3 bcm
Roseires, Sennar, and Merowe dams
water release rules
• During GERD filling, water releases are according
to historical rules
• During GERD long-term operation, reservoirs are
kept as high as possible to maximize energy
generation
• During GERD filling, water releases are according to
historical rules.
• During GERD long-term operation, reservoirs are kept
as high as possible to maximize energy generation
• Making way for water releases from the GERD that
are intended to benefit Egypt
HAD water release rules • When Egypt’s drought management plan is not
invoked, water is released to meet downstream
demands
• Water releases for irrigation are reduced
according to a drought management plan if the
reservoir storage is ≤60 bcm
(approximately 160m a.s.l.)
• When Egypt’s drought management plan is not
invoked, water is released to meet
downstream demands
•Water releases for irrigation are reduced according to
a drought management plan if the reservoir storage is
≤60 bcm (approximately 160m a.s.l.)
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each of the three countries has a role to play. Ethiopia has more
flexibility in GERD management when there is sufficient water in
the HAD reservoir (HADR) and when the flows of the other two
Eastern Nile tributaries (i.e., the White Nile and Tekeze-Atabra;
Fig. 1) are high. In addition, Egypt shares information with
Ethiopia on HAD storage and target water release. Coordinated
operation enables Ethiopia to avoid the constraints on minimum
releases from the GERD that are part of the Washington draft
proposal. Instead, water releases from the GERD always ensure
the satisfaction of water consumption targets on the Blue Nile and
Main Nile in Sudan, and when physically possible and HAD
storage is low (below 50 bcm), the satisfaction of water
consumption targets in Egypt, with Ethiopia able to seek
additional benefits under favorable streamflow conditions. A
HADR storage of 50 bcm is equivalent to a reservoir water level of
156 m a.s.l., which is 9 m above the turbine shutdown level of the
dam24. With thecoordinated operation, the operations of the
Roseires, Sennar, and Merowe dams located in Sudan between the
GERD and Egypt have been adapted to pass water releases from
the GERD intended to reach Egypt. Ethiopia is assumed to
operate the GERD to maximize the 90% power reliability and
sustain a minimum environmental flow of 43Mm3/day, subject
to constraints that water consumption targets in Sudan and Egypt
are satisfied under specific conditions.
These two filling and long-term operation approaches are
analyzed using 102 different 30-year river flow sequences (traces)
developed using the index-sequential method48. This method
generates river flow traces from the historical flow record, taking
every year in the record as a possible starting point. We used the
1901–2002 Nile flow data to generate the river flow traces (see
Supplementary Fig. 1).
Sudan receives irrigation, flood control, and hydropower
benefits from the GERD, assuming daily coordination and active
data sharing between the GERD and Roseires Dam. The
modeling results show that these benefits are essentially the
same with the Washington draft proposal and the coordinated
operation. This is due to Sudan’s geographic advantage of being
located upstream of Egypt and the relatively small storage dams
and hydropower capacity in the country. Furthermore, we
assume that the adverse environmental impacts and the loss of
recession agriculture in Sudan are similar in the two examined
GERD operation scenarios. Therefore, we only present the
results of the impacts of the coordinated operation for Ethiopia
and Egypt.
Coordination can improve water utilization. Figure 3 illustrates
the change in Nile water withdrawal in Egypt, hydropower gen-
eration of the GERD and Egypt, and the total reservoir eva-
poration, Toshka spills, and river channel seepage as a result of
coordinated operation compared to the Washington draft pro-
posal. Table 2 reports statistics for some of the metrics shown in
Fig. 3. Results show that in 77% of the traces simulated,
the coordinated operation would decrease Egypt’s total water
deficits compared to the Washington draft proposal. Most of the
significant decreases in irrigation water deficits occur after 2025
because the HADR is currently full49 and can satisfy any near-
term Egyptian water supply deficits that may occur in a specific
simulation. Supplementary Fig. 2 shows that the decreases in
Egypt’s irrigation deficits occur during multiyear periods of water
scarcity. Supplementary Fig. 2 also shows a drawdown of GERD
storage with the coordinated operation to help alleviate irrigation
water deficits in Egypt when HAD storage falls below 50 bcm.
This decline in GERD storage resulted in a small reduction in the
dam’s total energy generation.
Over 2020–2049, 58% of modeled traces show a decrease in the
total Egyptian hydropower generation in the coordinated
operating strategy compared to the Washington draft proposal.
Most of the significant annual declines in Egypt’s hydropower
happen from 2020 to 2030 due to the faster decrease in HADR
storage with the coordinated operation that results from rapid
GERD initial filling, which is enabled by the HADR having
enough initial storage at the start of the simulation to meet
Egypt’s target releases. In some simulated traces, electricity
Fig. 2 Illustration of the coordinated strategy for operating the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. HAD High Aswan Dam, GERD Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam. A detailed schematic of the river system model is provided in Supplementary Figure 7.
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generation from the HAD also declines beyond 2030 with
the coordinated operation compared to the Washington draft
proposal. This occurs because, in some simulated traces, the
coordinated operation shifts water storage from the HADR to
GERD Reservoir, resulting in lower water levels at the HAD and
higher water levels at the GERD.
Figures 3d, e show the effect of the coordinated operation on
GERD and system-wide hydropower generation, respectively,
compared to the Washington draft proposal. The time-series
plots show some declines in GERD electricity within the first 5
years, followed by increases. The declines occur because of lower
downstream water releases in the first 5 years to speed up
reservoir filling when the storage in the HADR is sufficient to
supplement river flows and thus avoid irrigation deficits in Egypt.
The long-term increase in GERD electricity generation (e.g., the
cyan-colored line in Fig. 3d) results from the faster initial filling
and the opportunistic long-term management of dam releases in
coordination with Egypt and Sudan. Supplementary Fig. 3 shows
how coordinated operation can result in higher reservoir storage
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Fig. 3 Difference in simulated water and energy metrics between the coordinated operation and the Washington draft proposal. a Irrigation water
withdrawal in Egypt. b Municipal water withdrawal in Egypt. c Hydropower generation in Egypt. d Electricity generation from the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam. e System-wide electricity generation from hydropower. f Total evaporation from human-made reservoirs, Toshka spills, and river
channel seepage. Positive values indicate higher simulated results with coordinated operation. The cyan- and red-colored points in the probability plots
correspond to the cyan- and red-colored river flow traces, respectively. GDP gross domestic product, GERD Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Table 2 Difference in selected water, energy, and economy metrics between the coordinated operation and the Washington draft
proposal.
Metrics accumulated over 30 years Maximum 90th percentile Median 10th percentile Minimum
Change in irrigation water withdrawal in Egypt (bcm) 27.3 16.2 1.4 0.0 −1.7
Change in Egypt hydropower generation (1000 GWh) 2.7 1.2 −0.1 −1.0 −2.1
Change in GERD electricity generation (1000GWh) 17.9 10.5 1.6 −0.8 −1.9
Change in water losses (bcm) 1.1 −0.2 −5.1 −12.1 −18.1
Change in Egyptian GDP present value (US$ billion) 4.1 2.5 0.24 0.0 −0.7
Change in present value of GERD electricity (US$ billion) 0.6 0.4 0.06 0.0 −0.05
Positive values indicate higher simulated results with the coordinated operation.
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Seventy-one percent of the simulated traces show an increase in
the GERD’s cumulative electricity generation over 2020–2049
compared to the Washington draft proposal. The change in the
GERD’s total electricity generation over the 2020–2049 simulation
period ranges from −1900 to 17,900 GWh, with a median of
around 1600 GWh. The changes in the GERD’s annual electricity
range from −35 to 84% compared to the operating policy of the
Washington draft proposal, with a median annual change of 0%,
increases in 40% of the years, and decreases in 10% of the years.
Figure 3f shows the impact of the coordinated operation on total
water losses from reservoir evaporation, spills to the Toshka
depression in Egypt, and channel seepage compared to the
Washington draft proposal. The coordinated operation changed
cumulative water losses over the 30-year simulation by −18.1 to
1.1 bcm depending on the hydrological trace, with a median of
around −5.1 bcm.
Coordination can enhance economic resilience. Nile flows to
Egypt play a vital role in the country’s economy. The agriculture
sector accounts for around 23% of the country’s employment50.
Changes to irrigation water supply affect the output of agriculture
and the livelihoods and employment of millions of Egyptians.
Moreover, changes to irrigation water availability affect other
economic activities that use agricultural products as intermediate
inputs due to forward and backward economic linkages. Although
hydropower contributes only around 7% to the Egyptian elec-
tricity mix, reduction in hydropower generation increases the use
of other electricity generation technologies with higher variable
costs. Figure 4a–e depicts the change in some macroeconomic
metrics of the Egyptian economy as a result of the coordinated
operation compared to the Washington draft proposal. Table 2
reports key statistics of some of these metrics from the model
simulations. Overall, the Egyptian GDP, investment, exports,
imports, and government savings would increase as a result of the
coordinated operation. The first 5 years of all model simulations
show an insignificant change in macroeconomic performance due
to the coordinated operation because the HADR starts the
simulation full and can supplement reduced inflows to the
HADR due to GERD filling and thus Egypt’s water needs can
continue to be met. The slight decline in macroeconomic per-
formance during the filling period is due to a reduction in Egypt’s
hydropower generation as a result of a speedup of GERD filling
under coordinated operation compared to the Washington draft
proposal (Fig. 3c). The positive changes in Egyptian macro-
economic performance beyond 2030 are due to improved irri-
gation water supply.
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Fig. 4 Difference in simulated economic metrics of Egypt and Ethiopia between the coordinated operation and the Washington draft proposal. a
Egypt’s GDP at market prices. b Egypt’s investment. c Egypt’s export. d Egypt’s imports. e Egypt’s government savings. f The financial value of GERD
electricity. Positive values indicate higher simulated results with the coordinated operation. The cyan- and red-colored points in the probability plots
correspond to the cyan- and red-colored river flow traces, respectively. The results are discounted at a 3% rate. The results in panel (f) are based on
Ethiopia’s current electricity export price to Sudan (US$ 0.05 per kWh). GDP gross domestic product, GERD Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
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As the economy-wide modeling results show, the direct and
indirect impacts of reduced irrigation deficits increase the
production of all economic activities and increase investment
(Fig. 4b). Investment grows due to an increase in the savings of
households, enterprises, and the Government of Egypt. Imports
and exports also increase with coordinated filling and long-term
operation of the GERD (Figs. 4c, d). Results for the coordinated
operation show an increase in government savings compared to
the Washington draft proposal (Fig. 4e). Government income
increases as a result of the indirect impacts of improvements in
irrigation water supply. Fewer and smaller irrigation water supply
deficits lead to an increase in the production of many industries,
which increases tax revenues. Moreover, the increase in industrial
production raises household income and demand for commod-
ities, imports, and import duties. Government savings increase
with coordinated operation as a result of the increase in
government income. With the coordinated operation, govern-
ment spending increases; the increase in government spending is
lower than the increase in government income resulting in a net
positive increase in government savings. Results show that the
change in the present value of Egypt’s GDP over the
2020–2049 simulated traces ranges between US$ −0.7 and US$
4.1 billion with a median of around US$ 0.24 billion (at a 3%
discount rate) and an increase in about 76% of the examined
hydrologic scenarios. Egypt’s investment, exports, imports, and
government savings follow a similar pattern to that of GDP with
median present value changes of around US$ 80, 70, 70, and 20
million, respectively, if the coordinated operation is adopted.
Most of the improvements in Egypt’s macroeconomic perfor-
mance occur during multiyear periods of water scarcity (5–15
years of the 30-year simulation period) when HAD storage is
below 50 bcm. The low median change in economic performance
indicates that in a large proportion of the simulated traces, the
HADR does not drop to a level that triggers GERD’s help.
Figure 4f shows the present value of the change in the GERD’s
electricity generation as a result of coordinated operation
compared to the Washington draft proposal. These results
assume that the change in electricity is valued at Ethiopia’s
current electricity export price to Sudan (US$ 0.05 per kilowatt-
hour (kWh)). It would be possible to estimate both the direct and
indirect effects of the GERD’s hydropower generation on the
Ethiopian economy using a CGE model similar to that used for
the Egyptian economy. However, a lack of information about how
much of the dam’s electricity will be consumed domestically, how
much will be exported, and the price at which electricity exported
is sold made this approach impractical in our analysis. Figure 4f
shows the change in the present value of the GERD’s electricity
generation due to coordinated operation over the period
2020–2049, assuming a value per kilowatt-hour of US$ 0.05
and a discount rate of 3%. The coordinated operation results in a
median change in the present value of the GERD’s electricity
generation of US$ 0.06 billion (range of minus US$ 0.05 billion to
US$ 0.60 billion depending on the hydrological scenario).
Coordinated operation results in an increase in the present value
of the GERD’s electricity generation in 71% of the examined
hydrological scenarios. The coordinated operation thus yields
improved economic outcomes to both Egypt and Ethiopia
compared to the Washington draft proposal.
Discussion
River flow is a complex, stochastic process that cannot be accu-
rately predicted51. Our analysis shows that stochasticity in river
flow has economy-wide implications, especially for economies
like Egypt that are heavily dependent on rivers with large annual
variations in flow. In such cases, it is necessary to consider
hydrologic stochasticity in the ex-ante economic analysis of
interventions in river systems, such as the operating strategy for
new infrastructure. Coupling biophysical and economy-wide
models is an improved approach for assessing direct, indirect, and
induced macroeconomic impacts (e.g., GDP, employment, and
income) of interventions in natural systems. Considering the
coevolution of economic growth and resource supply and
demand in simulating interventions in transboundary river sys-
tems enables analysts to better characterize the interdependencies
between natural, engineered, and economic systems. This multi-
sector dynamic analysis should be complemented with an
assessment of the environmental and social effects that are not
captured in macroeconomic indicators such as GDP52,53.
Water resources of the Nile River are limited and highly variable.
Efficient utilization of Nile waters is key to the economic growth
and resilience of its riparian states. This study demonstrates that a
coordinated strategy for operating the GERD can reduce water
deficits in Egypt, sustain Sudan’s Nile water use, and improve
economic outcomes in Egypt and Ethiopia compared to an
approach that resembles the Washington draft proposal. Although
the results show increased economic outcomes to Egypt and
Ethiopia from coordinated operation compared to the Washington
draft proposal, we use different approaches and performance
metrics to evaluate the economic impacts on the two countries.
The coordinated operation approach examined in this paper
imposes only a small decline in total GERD electricity generation
compared to an operation policy for the GERD that seeks to
maximize firm power reliability (Supplementary Fig. 4). The ben-
efits to Ethiopia from the coordinated operation of the GERD
compared to the Washington draft proposal include an expected
increase in total electricity generation. For Egypt, coordinated
operation changes both irrigation water supply and hydropower
generation. Overall, the CGE analysis indicates an expected positive
impact on Egypt’s economy from coordinated operation as a result
of reductions in irrigation deficits and changes in hydropower
compared to the Washington draft proposal. Results show an
increase in the present value of Egypt’s GDP is 76% of the simulated
hydrological traces. Most of the increases in Egypt’s GDP occur in
5–15 years during multiyear periods of water scarcity when coop-
eration is needed the most (Supplementary Figs. 2 and 3). Agree-
ment on a coordinated strategy could help facilitate regional water-
energy-food-economy integration between the Eastern Nile Basin
countries and achieve synergies that build on their comparative
advantages (e.g., agriculture, hydropower, industry, and access to
the sea). A multi-sector planning approach could increase resource
use efficiency and the total regional economic gains.
Based on NBI data on future water infrastructures on the
Eastern Nile, there is around 2.4 million hectares of undeveloped
irrigation area in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan54. In this
paper, we do not consider the impact of future irrigation
expansion on water availability and hydropower generation in the
Eastern Nile. However, future irrigation expansion in the Nile
Basin in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan would reduce the Nile
flow to Egypt.
Cooperation on transboundary rivers is not a binary decision
but rather a continuum that can take place in different forms
ranging between dispute and integration55,56. Cooperation often
develops in small steps over long time periods to ensure mutual
trust and political commitment57. Although the GERD is a
hydroelectric project that does not consume water apart from
reservoir evaporation and seepage losses (around 3.6 % of the
annual flow of the Blue Nile on average), the negotiations on the
initial filling and long-term operation of the dam are progres-
sively becoming about Nile water allocation/sharing. The Nile
water allocation issue has been outstanding for several decades,
and attempting to address this issue within the GERD
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negotiations will make an agreement harder to achieve. While a
deal on the initial filling and long-term operation of the GERD
needs to be legally binding to provide assurance to Sudan and
Egypt, it should be technically flexible and legally amendable to
accommodate potential water allocation arrangements and future
infrastructural development in Ethiopia. Seeking a technically
flexible and legally amendable agreement on GERD initial filling
and long-term operation could build trust between Ethiopia,
Sudan, and Egypt and make negotiations on the more contentious
water allocation issue more likely to succeed. The coordinated
operation strategy described in this paper could be a positive step
on this negotiation pathway and help foster a spirit of “neighbors
looking out for each other.”
Methods
Structure of the modeling framework. The coevolutionary macroeconomy and
river system simulation framework introduced in this study consists of two
modeling components: (a) the Egyptian economy and (b) the Nile river system.
The modeling framework accounts for the coevolutionary dynamics of river and
economic systems using an iterative process. This multi-sector framework is
designed for river systems with multiyear storage dams and a mix of hydro and
non-hydro electricity generation. The two modeling components are described
separately below, followed by a description of their interaction, which characterizes
two-way hydro-economic feedbacks. The application of the coevolutionary fra-
mework to the Nile is then discussed.
Economy-wide modeling component. The Egyptian economy-wide modeling
component is based on the IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute)
standard open-source CGE model43. The model was modified to include water,
energy, and land components and run dynamically (i.e., for a multiyear period).
In previous studies, water, energy, and land resources have been included in the
productive activities of CGE models in a variety of ways. A recent review of the
literature distinguished between CGE models that treat water as an explicit factor
of production, those that include water as an implicit factor of production (i.e.,
embedded in land productivity), and those that treat water as a commodity (i.e., an
intermediate input)58. Energy-oriented CGE models typically combine energy with
capital in the production structure of goods and services59,60. The inclusion of
energy in CGE models is straightforward compared to water because energy is a
marketed commodity that can be easily reallocated to different sectors. The real-
location of water supplies across space and time requires storage and network
infrastructure and is often constrained by unpredictable supplies (stochastic
hydrology). Moreover, raw water supplies are typically unpriced61–64; thus, the
economic value of water is not included in economic data (e.g., social accounting
matrices and input–output tables).
In this study, we modified IFPRI’s standard CGE model such that economic
activities produce commodities using a three-level process (Supplementary Fig. 5).
At the top level, composite intermediate inputs and the value-added-energy bundle
are combined to produce commodities using a Leontief Function65. The function
maintains fixed proportions of inputs (composite intermediate inputs and value-
added energy in this case) for each unit of output (commodity). At the second level,
energy and value-added are aggregated using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
function (CES)66, such that the optimal input quantities of value-added and energy
for each activity are determined based on relative prices subject to substitution
elasticity similar to energy-oriented CGE models59. At the third level, substitution
is allowed between the electricity commodity and other energy commodities using
a CES function.
A CES function is also used to combine labor, capital, and land into value-added.
The model is customized to allow each household group to allocate its
consumption budget to the purchase of commodities based on a nested linear
expenditure system (LES)67 and CES (Supplementary Fig. 5). At the top level, a LES
function is used to divide the consumption budget between essential and
nonessential demands68. The nonessential consumption budget is divided between
five commodity categories using fixed shares. Each category includes different
commodities that can substitute each other based on CES functions.
We modified the IFPRI CGE model to include four types of capital: (a) hydro
capital used by a hydropower activity to produce electricity, (b) non-hydro capital
used by a non-hydro activity to produce electricity, (c) water capital used by a
municipal water activity to produce municipal water, and (d) general capital used
by other activities. The use of land and water capital varies endogenously based on
their rents. Logistic functions are used to simulate the response of the use of land
and water capital to their rents. General and non-hydro capital grow based on past
investments. Investment is allocated between these two capital types according to
their relative rates of return. Given the increase in electricity demand resulting
from economic growth, this specification of investment behavior allows for an
incremental expansion of non-hydro electricity generation capacity; hydropower
capacity does not grow endogenously with the year-to-year investment allocation.
It is assumed that no new hydropower investments are made over the 30-year
simulation period. To connect the economy-wide model with the river system
model, dynamic exogenous shocks on land, water capital, hydro capital, and non-
hydro capital are introduced to the economic model based on the river system
modeling component, which simulates water and electricity availability, as
explained below.
River system modeling component. Pywr, a generic open-source Python library
for simulating resource system networks42, is used to model the water system,
including hydropower generation, in addition to an aggregated representation of
non-hydro electricity generation. Pywr allows building resource system elements
using input (e.g., catchments), output (e.g., water abstraction), and storage nodes
(e.g., reservoirs). Nodes are linked in a network fashion to enable the flow and
allocation of resources such as water and electricity. Pywr uses a time-stepping
linear programming approach to drive resource allocation using priorities and
system operating rules. Any time step resolution can be selected for Pywr simu-
lations (e.g., hourly, daily, weekly, and monthly). Pywr’s multi-scenario simulation
allows consideration of uncertainty in resource systems, e.g., hydrologic
stochasticity.
The simulation results of Pywr can be processed, observed, and/or saved
through “recorders.” We extended Pywr “recorders” to enable annual aggregation
of the water and electricity metrics required for integration with the economy-wide
modeling component. These metrics include annual irrigation and municipal water
supply fractions, annual electricity generation from hydropower dams, and annual
electricity generation from non-hydro energy generators.
Coevolutionary macroeconomy and river system simulation. Supplementary
Fig. 6 shows a flowchart of the novel coevolutionary macroeconomy and river
system generalized hydro-economic69 modeling framework. The figure shows the
interaction between the economy-wide modeling component (with an annual time
step) and the river system modeling component (with a monthly time step) within
each annual time step. Dynamic-recursive multiyear simulations are performed by
repeating the procedure in Supplementary Fig. 6 multiple times.
The dynamic behavior of CGE models is typically driven by external drivers,
such as capital growth (determined as a function of previous investment levels),
labor growth, and productivity trends. In the first iteration, the CGE model solves
based on its external drivers and determines changes to annual water and electricity
demands and non-hydro electricity generation capacity relative to the economy’s
initial year. Changes produced by the CGE model in relation to the irrigated area,
the water capital, the demand for the electricity commodity, and the non-hydro
capital are used as an estimate in the river system model for changes in irrigation
water demand, municipal water demand, electricity demand, and non-hydro
electricity generation capacity, respectively. The first CGE iteration assumes no
irrigation deficit and electricity generation equal to that of the base year. The CGE
and the river system models iteratively correct the initial assumptions of water
curtailments and electricity generation, as explained in more detail below.
CGE models typically have an annual time step, but river system models run at
smaller time intervals (e.g., monthly, weekly, daily, hourly). River system models
have finer temporal resolutions to enable simulation of the spatial and temporal
constraints of river basin resource systems, i.e., to better capture the consequences
of stochastic hydrology and infrastructure constraints (e.g., reservoir storage).
Although the iterative framework presented in Supplementary Fig. 6 is based on a
monthly river system model, models with smaller time steps could also be used.
The river system model uses the changes in irrigation water demand, municipal
water demand, electricity demand, and non-hydro electricity generation capacity,
computed by the economy-wide modeling component, to scale the corresponding
water and electricity parameters. The river system model then performs a monthly
simulation over a 12-month period based on monthly river flow data and the
modified water and electricity demands and non-hydro capacity. The river system
model then computes the fractions of annual irrigation and municipal water
demands that can be met in addition to the annual hydro and non-hydro electricity
generation. Water supply and electricity generation depend on the spatial and
temporal availability of natural resources (e.g., river flow), infrastructure capacities
(e.g., non-hydro and hydro capacities), and infrastructure operating rules.
After the river system modeling component determines water supply fractions
and electricity generation, two tests are performed to determine (a) whether the
models have converged and (b) when to stop iterating. These tests indicate whether
to proceed to the next iteration or accept the current state of the CGE and the river
system models as a solution for the annual time step. Passing either of the two tests
terminates the iterative convergence process. The CGE and the river system models
pass the convergence test when the difference between the current and the previous
iteration’s values of an annual economy, water, or energy metric falls below a
certain convergence threshold. The value of the threshold depends on the desired
level of accuracy and available computational capacity. The stopping test imposes a
maximum number of iterations at which the current state of the CGE and the river
system models is considered a solution for the annual time step. The stopping test
acts as a safeguard to prevent excessively long iteration over one annual time step.
The convergence test is performed starting from the second iteration. Thus, at least
two iterations are performed within each annual time step to ensure convergence.
Failure in the convergence and stopping tests results in proceeding to the next
iteration. In the next iteration, annual water supply fractions and electricity
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generation of the previous iteration are applied to the CGE model to compute new
changes to annual water and electricity demands and non-hydro electricity
generation capacity relative to the initial year of the economy (i.e., the base year).
The irrigation and municipal water supply fractions, computed by the river system
modeling component, are introduced to the CGE model as shocks to the land and
water capital, respectively. The ratio between current electricity generation and
electricity generation in the initial year of the economy is calculated for each of the
two electricity generation technology groups (i.e., hydro and non-hydro) and
introduced as shocks to the hydro and non-hydro capitals.
Implementation of the coevolutionary framework. The open-source Python
Network Simulation (Pynsim) framework44 was extended and used to integrate the
economy-wide and river system modeling components and to manage their
iteration, sequencing, and time stepping. Each of the two components was specified
as a Pynsim “engine”44. Although the IFPRI CGE model is written in the General
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS)70, it was linked to Pynsim through the GAMS
Python Application Programming Interface. Eight Pynsim integration nodes were
created for data exchange between the economy-wide and river system modeling
components. Four of the integration nodes transfer changes in annual water
(irrigation and municipal) and electricity demands and non-hydro electricity
generation capacity from the economy-wide to the river system modeling com-
ponents. The other four integration nodes transfer the annual water (irrigation and
municipal) supply fractions and hydro and non-hydro electricity generation from
the river system to the economy-wide modeling components.
Eastern Nile River system model. Supplementary Fig. 7 shows a schematic of the
monthly river system model of the Eastern Nile Basin. The model uses naturalized
inflow data for the period 1901–2002, obtained from the Eastern Nile Technical
Regional Office54. The Eastern Nile River System model contains all major dams and
water consumers in the basin, including the GERD and the HAD. The baseline water
withdrawal targets are shown in Supplementary Fig. 8. Supplementary Table 1 reports
the main characteristics of the dams included in the Nile River System model. The
model was calibrated and validated at eight locations across the basin based on
historically observed river flows and reservoir water levels over 1970–2002. This
period was chosen based on the availability of observed data. Supplementary Fig. 9
and Supplementary Table 2 show the performance of the Eastern Nile River system at
eight locations. In the model, non-hydro electricity generation is used to fill the gap
between hydropower generation and electricity demand, subject to generation capa-
city. This assumption is valid since hydropower in Egypt is a by-product of other
activities. Furthermore, the historical evolution of the Egyptian electricity mix shows
relatively regular annual hydropower generation with a steady increase in electricity
generation from other technologies to fill the supply-demand gap8.
Initial filling assumptions of the Washington draft proposal. Supplementary
Table 3 describes the 5-year plan for the initial filling of the GERD in the
Washington draft proposal assuming normal or above-average hydrological con-
ditions. We assumed that after achieving the water retention target of the first year
(4.9 bcm), two 375MW turbines become operational. The rest of the turbines
become operational after achieving the second year’s water retention target
(18.4 bcm). We assumed that once the filling targets of year-1 or year-2 are
achieved, reservoir storage is always maintained above these targets in order to
keep the turbines operational. In the Washington draft proposal, water retention is
limited to July and August, with a minimum environmental release of 43 Mm3/day.
During the initial filling period, from September to June, releases from the GERD
equal the inflow to the reservoir. However, if a drought occurs during the 5-year
initial filling plan specified in Table S3, the Washington draft proposal has pro-
visions for implementing delays in filling the GERD (our assumptions for these
provisions are described in a later section).
Long-term operation assumptions of the Washington draft proposal. The
Washington draft proposal’s operating rules for the long-term operation of the
GERD begins when reservoir storage reaches 49.3 bcm. We assumed that when
reservoir storage is at or above 49.3 bcm, water is released through the GERD’s
turbines to maintain a constant monthly energy production of 1170 GWh to
maximize the 90% power generation reliability71. If reservoir storage drops below
49.3 bcm, the target monthly energy production is reduced to 585 GWh. The
purpose of reducing the energy generation target is to enable the GERD storage to
recover above 49.3 bcm. Water releases designed to maintain a regular power rate
depend on the reservoir water level at the beginning of the time step (the higher the
water level, the lower the releases required). A minimum environmental release of
43Mm3/day is maintained throughout the year when possible. Additional water
releases may be made following drought mitigation mechanisms that resem-
ble those of the Washington draft proposal, as described below.
Drought mitigation assumptions of the Washington draft proposal. The
Washington plan includes three mechanisms to mitigate the adverse effects of
droughts, prolonged droughts, and prolonged periods of dry years on the down-
stream riparians46. The mechanism for mitigating droughts is triggered when the
GERD’s annual inflow is forecast to be ≤37 bcm. This first mechanism requires
Ethiopia to release a minimum annual water volume, depending on the forecast
annual inflow and GERD storage at the beginning of the hydrologic year (see
Exhibit A in Egypt’s letter to the United Nations Security Council dated 19 June
202046).
The effectiveness of the mechanism for mitigating droughts depends on the
accuracy of the forecast of the annual inflow for the upcoming hydrological year.
To implement the Washington plan in this study’s river simulation model, we do
not forecast annual flows for the next hydrological year. Instead, drought
mitigation conditions are checked in March of every hydrologic year, by which
time, on average, about 96% of the river’s annual flow is already known because it
occurs from June to February. If necessary, water releases during the remaining
3 months of the hydrological year (March–May) are increased to achieve the
minimum annual releases specified in the mechanism for mitigating droughts.
These increased releases during March–May effectively offset any deviations from
water releases specified by the drought mitigation mechanism given the dam
inflows and releases in the previous 9 months of the current hydrologic year.
The mechanism for mitigating prolonged droughts requires that the average
annual release over every 4-year period equal at least 39 bcm (37 bcm during the
initial filling). In the implementation of this prolonged drought mitigation
mechanism of the Washington draft proposal in our river simulation model, we
check in March of every hydrological year to ensure that this annual average release
over the previous 4-year period is achieved. Although this mechanism does not
depend on reservoir inflow, it is also checked for in March to provide flexibility to
GERD operation during the rest of the year.
The mechanism for mitigating prolonged periods of dry years is similar to the
prolonged drought mitigation mechanism, except the period over which annual
releases are averaged is longer (5 years) and the average annual release is higher
(40 bcm). We implement this mechanism in our river simulation model in the same
way, checking in March of every hydrological year to ensure that the annual average
release over the previous 5-year period is achieved. Supplementary Fig. 10 shows the
exceedance probability of the annual, 4-year average annual, and 5-year average
annual flow of Blue Nile at the location of the GERD over the period 1901–2002. The
drought mitigation thresholds of the Washington draft proposal are marked in the
figure to show their probability of occurrence in the river flow data.
If a deficit from the minimum releases of any of the three mechanisms is
identified at the beginning of March, water releases over March–May are increased
equally in each month to offset the deficit.
Initial filling assumptions of the coordinated operation. The coordinated
operating strategy for the initial filling of the GERD is similar to the Washington
plan, except for the retention of inflows to meet the targets in Table S3 is not
constrained to July and August. The coordinated operation requires that a mini-
mum environmental release of 43 Mm3/day be maintained throughout the year
when possible. If physically possible, releases from the GERD are also greater than
or equal to (1) Sudan’s monthly water withdrawal targets along the Blue and Main
Nile, plus (2) Egypt’s monthly water release target from the HAD if HAD storage is
below 50 bcm (156 m a.s.l.). This operating strategy enables Ethiopia to avoid
delays in filling the GERD as long as HAD storage is at or above 50 bcm. In
simulating coordinated operation, the operations of the Roseires, Sennar, and
Merowe dams have been adapted to pass GERD releases intended to benefit Egypt.
It was assumed that two of the GERD turbines become operational after achieving
the first year’s water retention target, and the rest of the turbines become opera-
tional once the second year’s filling target is achieved. After achieving the filling
targets of year-1 or year-2, reservoir storage is always maintained above these
targets (i.e., 4.9 or 18.4 bcm) to keep the turbines operational.
Long-term operation assumptions of the coordinated operation. As with the
Washington draft proposal, the long-term operation of the GERD begins as soon as
reservoir storage reaches 49.3 bcm. Also the same as the Washington plan, it was
assumed that when reservoir storage is at or above 49.3 bcm, water is released
through the GERD’s turbines to maintain a constant monthly energy production of
1170 GWh to maximize the 90% power generation reliability71. If reservoir storage
drops below 49.3 bcm, the target monthly energy generation is reduced to
585 GWh. A minimum environmental release of 43 Mm3/day is maintained
throughout the year when physically possible. The key difference between the
Washington draft proposal and coordinated operation is that when physically
possible, the coordinated operation ensures that the GERD releases are greater than
or equal to Sudan’s water withdrawal targets on the Blue and Main Nile plus
Egypt’s target releases from the HAD if HAD storage is below 50 bcm (156 m asl).
This provides Ethiopia more flexibility in the operation of the GERD as long as
HAD storage is at or above 50 bcm.
Drought mitigation assumptions of the coordinated operation. The coordi-
nated operation strategy does not include drought mitigation measures that are
based on minimum annual water releases. Instead, a dynamic mechanism is used to
help reduce downstream water deficits during periods of water scarcity, as
explained in previous sections. Such an approach provides flexibility to Ethiopia in
GERD operation and increases the basin-wide and national water, electricity, and
economic gains.
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Economy-wide model of Egypt. The CGE model of Egypt represents a dynamic-
recursive, single-country, open-economy, including four agent types: households,
enterprises, the government, and the rest of the world. Households are classified
into ten groups based on location (urban or rural) and income (five quintiles). The
model includes 11 production activities: agriculture, light industry, heavy industry,
construction, transport, hydropower, non-hydro, other energy, municipal water
supply, public services, and other services. Each of the 11 activities produces a
distinct commodity except hydropower and non-hydro, which produce a similar
commodity (i.e., electricity). Production activities use six factors of production to
produce commodities: labor, land, general capital, water capital, hydro capital, and
non-hydro capital. Labor and general capital are assumed to be mobile across
production activities, whereas land, water capital, hydro capital, and non-hydro
capital are specific to agriculture, municipal water supply, hydropower, and non-
hydro, respectively. Labor is updated exogenously to follow the projected changes
in the 16–64 age group of the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) “middle of
the road” scenario72. Total factor productivity is also updated exogenously to
follow economic performance under the “middle of the road” scenario.
The CGE model of Egypt assumes fixed price of commodities on the international
market following the small open-economy assumption, i.e., that the economy
participates in international trade but does not affect world prices73. Government
spending is simulated as a fixed share of total absorption (total demand for
marketed goods and services). The model follows the saving-investment identity
(savings are equal to investment) assuming fixed saving propensities. Foreign savings
are assumed fixed, and the exchange rate is flexible.
The baseline model was calibrated to a 2019 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of
Egypt. The 2019 SAM was generated based on a 2011 SAM using an expansion
factor equal to the ratio between the Egyptian GDP in the 2 years. We compared
the generated SAM with the structure of Egypt’s economy based on the most recent
data in the World Bank Database; no significant differences were found in the
economy’s structure. Supplementary Fig. 11 shows this comparison.
Nile River system–Egypt’s economic integration. The Eastern Nile River system
model and the CGE model of Egypt run dynamically over a 30-year simulation
period (2020–2049) and multiple scenarios. For each 30-year simulation, the CGE
model executes 30 annual time steps, and the river system model executes
360 monthly time steps (30 years × 12 months). The CGE and river system models
are integrated through the water and electricity sectors, as described earlier. The
convergence test is performed using the GDP at market prices with an assumed
convergence threshold of US$ 5 million. A maximum of 50 iterations is specified
for each annual time step. All simulated time steps converged in <50 iterations.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding
author upon reasonable request at Zenodo: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4314574. The
corresponding author will make the economy-related data available upon
reasonable request. The Eastern Nile River system model and its data are not publicly
available due to state restrictions and contain information that could compromise
research participant privacy/consent.
Code availability
The Pywr and Pynsim software libraries used to develop the integrated economy-wide
and river system model are open-source and freely available in the following repositories:
https://github.com/pywr/pywr; https://github.com/UMWRG/pynsim. The standard CGE
model of IFPRI is freely accessible through the following link: https://www.ifpri.org/
publication/standard-computable-general-equilibrium-cge-model-gams-0.
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